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Abstract 
In light of the ongoing restructuring of the European banking industry and the challenging 
macroeconomic environment, banks have increased their efforts to reduce operating costs. 
Yet, the institutional features that affect banks’ ability to adjust costs and in particular 
personnel expenses, which comprise a significant part of banks’ non-interest cost structure, 
have not been adequately studied. This paper investigates the effect of labour market 
institutions and regulations on bank performance in 15 European countries over the period 
2005-2010, using the Fraser index for labour regulation and its disaggregated sub-
components. We propose a novel methodology to measure performance, based on the seminal 
work of Kumbhakar and Tsionas (2005), which allows the estimation of technical and 
allocative efficiency and the examination of the effect of labour market regulations in a single 
stage. Results indicate the existence of a positive relationship between the liberalization of 
EU labour markets and allocative efficiency, while the effect on technical efficiency appears 
to be negative, although not statistically significant. When looking at the disaggregated 
components of the labour index, we further confirm that different forces are at play.  
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1. Introduction 
Over the past years, the European banking industry has undergone significant restructuring, 
which has been further triggered by the financial crisis. As part of this restructuring process, 
banks have tried to improve their performance through a reduction in operating costs and 
have implemented wide-ranging cost-cutting measures by implementing organizational 
changes and reducing both their branch networks and the number of their employees (ECB, 
2003). Moreover, in the current challenging environment for banks’ profitability, with low 
interest rates and slow credit growth, banks are forced to intensify their efforts to review their 
cost structures in order to reduce costs, including through personnel expenses (ECB, 2013). 
Although personnel expenses comprise a relatively small fraction of banks’ cost compared to 
other industries, they have been at the centre of bank managers’ cost-cutting efforts during 
recent years. Data from the OECD Bank Profitability Report (2010)1 suggest that the ratio of 
personnel expenses as a share of total cost in European banking systems exhibits a clear 
downward trend after 2005 in most countries. Moreover, OECD data show that there are 
significant differences across countries, as the percentage of staff expenses to total costs 
ranges from 5 per cent in Luxembourg to about 24 per cent in Greece. The observed cross-
country differences may indicate that banks face different constrains across countries that 
affect their ability to adjust their labour costs. These constrains may be related, among others 
things, to the framework of labour institutions and regulations. According to Bertola (2009), 
labour regulations play a very important role in the allocation of a key production input, that 
is, labour. In particular, he finds that limited wage-setting flexibility, as well as of regulatory 
constraints on hiring and firing, and of employment protection legislation on labour mobility 
can have a significant effect on the allocation of labour. Boeri et al. (2008) also argue that 
labour market regulations can affect firms’ choices over inputs, investments, technology and 
                                                        
1
 See Figure C1 in the Appendix. 
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output. Consequently, banks’ ability to adjust staff costs and their responsiveness to changing 
circumstances may be highly influenced, by labour institutions and regulations.  
While a number of studies have examined the impact of labour regulations at a macro level 
(e.g., Botero et al.,2004; Lazear, 1990), very few microeconomic empirical studies analyse 
the impact of labour market rigidities on firm-level outcomes (Lafontaine and Sivadasan, 
2007).2 Moreover, to our knowledge no study has performed such an analysis for the banking 
system, with the exception of the study of Mamatzakis et al. (2013), which focuses on 
business regulation. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature and to investigate 
the effects of labour market regulation and labour institutions on bank efficiency in the 
European banking industry over the period 2005-2010. Moreover, our aim is to examine 
whether labour regulations affect banks’ performance through the channel of technical 
efficiency or through allocative efficiency. To this end, we propose a new methodology, 
which builds on Kumbhakar and Tsionas (2005a) that allows us to estimate technical and 
allocative efficiency and examine the effect of labour regulations in a single stage.3 In order 
to capture labour market regulations, we employ one of the five subcomponents of the Fraser 
Index of Economic Freedom, namely, labour market liberalization. This indicator quantifies 
the degree of stringency and distortions associated with existing labour regulations and 
institutions and provides a synthetic measure of the anti-competitive implications of existing 
regulations and institutions (European Commission, 2012). 
Overall, our study aims to address a number of questions regarding the effect of labour 
regulation on bank performance and to discuss their policy implications: Do labour 
                                                        
2 At the aggregate level, the effect of labour market regulations on economic outcomes is the subject of an 
ongoing debate among economists and policymakers (Boeri et al., 2008). Some argue that regulations affect 
negatively economic efficiency and therefore are detrimental for growth, while others argue that they are 
essential tools to correct market imperfections and achieve goals of redistribution without hampering efficiency 
(see Boeri and van Ours, 2008 for a discussion). 
3 In particular, we opt for maximum likelihood estimation of technical and allocative efficiency, while allowing 
errors in the share equations also to be present in the cost function equation. 
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regulations and institutions affect banks’ ability to adjust labour costs and do they have an 
impact on bank efficiency? Is this impact the same for technical and allocative efficiency or 
are there different forces at play? How do different aspects of labour market regulation, as 
captured by the sub-components of the labour liberalization index, affect banks’ allocative 
and technical efficiency?  
A first glimpse at the results shows a positive relationship between the liberalization of EU 
labour markets and allocative efficiency, while the relationship between technical efficiency 
and the labour market liberalization does not appear to be significant. When disaggregating 
the labour market regulation index into its components, we are able to capture the different 
forces at play. In particular, the analysis of the sub-components of the labour market 
regulation index provides evidence that price-related labour market regulations significantly 
affect bank performance through the channel of allocative efficiency. On the other hand, 
there appears to be no strong evidence of a significant relationship with technical efficiency. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical framework 
and the hypotheses we examine in this study, while Section 3 presents the methodology. 
Section 4 describes the dataset, while empirical results are presented in Section 5. Finally, 
Section 6 offers some concluding remarks and possible policy implications. 
 
2. Literature review and related hypotheses  
Labour market regulation is the subject of much theoretical work as well as extensive 
empirical research (Bertola, 2009). In particular, labour market regulations that constrain 
firms’ ability to adjust employment levels are an important and controversial public policy 
issue in many countries around the world. The relevant literature has mainly focused on the 
macroeconomic effects of labour market regulation and its impact on output and 
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unemployment (Lazear, 1990; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Botero et al., 2004; Nickell, 
1997; Nickell and Layard, 1999; Heckman and Pages, 2003). More specifically, labour 
regulations are often cited as a determinant of economic performance in OECD countries 
predominantly suggests that a higher degree of labour market regulation leads to efficiency 
losses for firms (e.g. Freeman, 1988; Nickell and Layard, 1999). It appears that the literature 
predominantly suggests that a higher degree of labour market regulation leads to efficiency 
losses for firms (Freeman, 1988; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Nickell, 1997; Nickell and 
Layard, 1999; Besley and Burgess, 2004). This is manifested in rising employment costs as a 
result of stricter employment protection legislation (Bassanini and Ernst 2002; Scarpetta and 
Tressel 2004), which in turn, negatively affects firms’ returns from innovation and 
technology, resulting in declining productivity growth (Malcomson 1997). On the other hand, 
other studies have shown that labour market regulations can cause increased wage pressures 
and could result in higher labour productivity due to capital deepening and investment in 
capital-intensive industries (Autor et al., 2007). 
Overall, most labour market regulations were initially introduced with the aim of enhancing 
workers’ welfare and improving employment conditions (OECD, 2004). However, the same 
provisions that protect employees translate into a cost for firms and thus could have a 
negative impact on firm performance through restrictions on the optimal amount of labour 
that firms employ or through affecting the price of the labour input. The literature on labour 
market regulation highlights both potential positive and negative effects for firm 
performance. For example, positive effects can result from the benefits of a high degree of 
employment security, which may create incentives for employees to invest in firm-specific 
human capital. Thus, employment security may enhance firm productivity by encouraging 
investment in human capital, since longer-lasting employment will increase the expected 
returns to training (Belot et al., 2002). In addition, Auer (2007) argues that strict employment 
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protection, and labour market regulation more generally, reduces excessive labour turnover, 
facilitates the reallocation of resources into activities having above-average productivity 
growth, and generates high-quality job matches. Furthermore, Autor et al., (2007) argue that 
labour market regulations that enhance wage pressures would induce higher labour 
productivity due to capital deepening and investment in capital-intensive technologies. This is 
also supported by Storm and Naastepad (2009), who showed that at the macro level a 
regulated and ‘rigid’ industrial relations system promotes labour productivity growth in 
twenty OECD countries. Moreover, Deakin and Sarkar (2008) also showed that labour 
regulation that strengthens dismissal laws has positive effects on productivity growth in 
France and Germany, and in the United States over the long term (from the 1970s to mid-
2000s).  
Hypothesis 1: Under this approach, we would expect a negative relationship between labour 
market liberalization and bank performance. 
On the other hand, restrictive labour market regulations may diminish firms’ ability to cope 
with a rapidly changing environment driven by globalisation, technological change and the 
derived organisational innovation (OECD, 2004). Indeed, labour market regulations imposing 
for example high dismissal costs may affect firm’s decision on whether to hire new workers, 
as it has to take into account the likelihood that firing costs will be incurred in the future. 
Moreover, according to Scarpetta and Tressel (2004), strict labour market regulations that 
raise the cost of adjusting factor inputs, including labour, are likely to reduce incentives for 
innovation and adoption of new technologies, and lead to lower productivity performance.  
Hypothesis 2: Under this approach, we would expect a positive relationship between labour 
market liberalization and bank performance.  
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Another interesting question that this study aims to address is whether the labour market 
regulation equally affects technical and allocative efficiency. As labour market regulations 
can directly affect both the price of the labour input and can also constrain the ability of firms 
to adjust the amount of labour they employ, they can thus have a potential impact on both 
technical and allocative efficiency. To this end, we test the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: Labour market regulations affect both technical and allocative efficiency in the 
same way. 
 
3. Decomposing efficiency into technical and allocative: a theoretical framework  
In this section, we lay out the model proposed in Kumbhakar (1997) and Tsionas and 
Kumbhakar (2006). Let the production technology be specified as ( )iui iq f x e−=  where qi is 
output and xi is a vector of J inputs for firm i (i = 1, …, n), f (.) is the production function, and 
0iu ≥  measures input-oriented (IO) technical inefficiency (Farrell, 1957). This specification 
implies that a technically inefficient bank over-uses all the inputs by u ⋅ 100 percent compared 
to an efficient bank producing the same output. Consequently, the IO measure of technical 
inefficiency is useful, when the objective of the banks is to allocate inputs in such a way that 
cost is minimized for an exogenously given level of outputs (which are services for banks). In 
allocating inputs banks may make mistakes. These mistakes are labelled as allocative 
inefficiency. Here we follow Schmidt and Lovell (1979) and Kumbhakar (1997) in modelling 
allocative inefficiency (non-fulfillment of the first-order conditions of cost minimisation), 
viz., ,1 , 1,( ) / ( ) / , 2,...,j ii iu uj i i j i if x e f x e w e w j Jξ− − = = , where fj (.) is the marginal product of input j 
and wj is the price of input j. Here a non-zero value of ,j iξ  indicates the presence of allocative 
inefficiency for the input pair (j,1) for firm i.  
Since 
,j iξ  represents allocative inefficiency for the input pair (j, 1) the relevant input prices to 
the firm i (i = 1, …, n) are *iw ≡ ( 1,iw , 2, 2,exp( )i iw ξ ,…, , ,exp( ))J i J iw ξ ′ , where 2, ,,...,i J iξ ξ  are random 
variables that capture allocative inefficiency. Kumbhakar (1997) showed that actual cost can 
be expressed as 
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* *ln ln ( , ) ln ( , , )ai i i i i i iC C w q G w q uξ= + +        (1) 
where 
, ,
a
ji j i j iC w x= ∑ and * *( , )i iC w q  is the minimum cost function obtained from solving the 
following problem: *'min subject to
u
i
u -u
i i i i
x e
w x e q f(x e )
−
−
= . The G( , ,i i iw q ξ ) function in (1) is 
defined as ,*
,
(.) j ij j iG S e ξ−=∑ ,where * * *, ,ln (.) / lnj i j iS C w= ∂ ∂ . Since (1) is strongly separable in iu , 
cost of technical inefficiency (percentage increase in cost due to technical inefficiency) is 
represented by 0iu ≥ . The allocative inefficiency terms ( jξ ) appear both in the *(.)C  and the 
G(.) functions. Thus, to separate the cost of allocative inefficiency, we need to define 
0 ( , )i iC w q , the cost frontier (also labeled as the neoclassical cost function). For this, we rewrite 
the cost function in (1) as 0ln ln ( , ) ln ( , , )a ALi i i i i i iC C w q C w q uξ= + + where 0 ( , )i iC w q  is the cost 
frontier (the neo-classical cost function), which can be obtained from the cost function in (1) 
by imposing restrictions that firms are efficient both technically and allocatively. That is, 
0
,
ln (.) ln (. | 0 , 0)a j i iC C j uξ= = ∀ = * , 0 , 0ln (.) | (since ln (.) | 0)j i j iC Gξ ξ= == = and ln ( , , )AL i i iC w q ξ  
0 * *
0ln | ln (.) ln ( , ) ln ( , , )ia u i i i i iC C C w q G w q ξ== − = + 0ln (.)C− . The ln ALiC term can be interpreted as 
the percentage increase in cost due to allocative inefficiency. 
If we assume a parametric functional form (e.g., translog) for *(.)C , i.e., 
( )2* * * * * *1 10 , , , ,2 2ln ( , ) ln ln ln ln ln ln lni i j j i q i qq i jk j i k i jq j i ij j k jC w q w q q w w w qα α γ γ β γ= + + + + +∑ ∑∑ ∑  
the cost function and the associated cost share equations in terms of C0(.) are (see Kumbhakar 
and Tsionas 2005), p. 738): 
ln(Cia / w1,i ) = lnCi0( %wi ,qi ) + lnCiAL ( %wi ,qi ,ξi ) + ui ,      (2) 
S j ,i
a
= S j ,i
0 ( %wi ,qi ) +η j ,i ( %wi ,qi ,ξi ) , 1,...,i n= ; j = 2, …, J     (3) 
where %wi = (w2,i / w1,i ,...,wJ ,i / w1,i ), , , , /a aj i j i j i iS w x C=  is the actual (observed) cost share of input j  
( 2,..., )j J= , Ci
0 ( %wi ,qi )  is the normalized (by 1,iw ) cost frontier and 0 0, ,ln (.) / lnj i i j iS C w= ∂ ∂  
( 2,..., )j J= .  For the above translog cost function lnCi
0( %wi ,qi )  is 
lnCi
0(.) = α0 + α j ln %w j ,i +γq ln qi + 12 γqq ln qi( )2 + 12 β jk ln %w j ,i ln %wk ,i + γ jq ln %w j ,i ln qij=2
J
∑ ,
k=2
J
∑
j=2
J
∑
j=2
J
∑  (4) 
 S j ,i
0
= α j + β jk ln %wk ,i +γ jq ln qi
k=2
J
∑ , j = 2,..., J ,         (5) 
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lnCi
AL
= lnGi + α jξ j ,i + β jkξ j ,i ln %wk ,i +
k=2
J
∑
j=2
J
∑
j=2
J
∑ 12 β jkξ j ,iξk ,i +
k=2
J
∑
j=2
J
∑ γ jqξ j ,i ln qij=2
J
∑ ,     (6) 
{ }0, , ,
,
,
1 exp( )
exp( )
j i i j i j i
j i
i j i
S G a
G
ξ
η ξ
− +
= ,  2,...,j J=       (7) 
where 
0
, , ,
2
( ) exp( )Ji j i j i j ijG S a ξ== + −∑ ,        (8) 
and  
, ,
2
J
j i jk k i
k
a β ξ
=
= ∑ .           (9)  
The cost system defined in (2) and (3) serves two purposes.4 First, technical and allocative 
inefficiencies are modeled in a coherent manner. Second, the exact link between allocative 
inefficiency ( jξ ) and its cost is given in (6). The cost function decomposes the overall 
increase in cost due to inefficiency into two components, viz., the percentage increase in cost 
due to allocative inefficiency, ln ALiC , and the percentage increase in cost due to technical 
inefficiency, ui.  The decomposition formula also establishes an exact link between the error 
terms in the cost share equations (which are functions of allocative inefficiency) and cost of 
allocative inefficiency, which is very important from estimation point of view.  
In general, the link is provided by the relationship ln ( , , )AL i i iC w q ξ  = * *ln ( , ) ln ( , , )i i i i iC w q G w q ξ+
0ln (.)C− . For the Cobb-Douglas case, this link is established in Schmidt and Lovell (1979), 
viz., 1
2 2 1
ln ln ln[ ]j
J J J
AL
j j j j
j j j
C e ξα ξ α α α−
= = =
 
= + + − 
 
∑ ∑ ∑ . Since Schmidt and Lovell used the system 
consisting of the production function and the first-order conditions of cost minimization, it 
was not necessary to use the above link in estimation. It was, however, used to compute the 
cost of allocative inefficiency.   
                                                        
4 The cost system of equations follows Kumbhakar and Tsionas (2005) and provides a way to estimate both 
technical and allocative efficiency when the underlying cost function is a flexible functional form such as a 
translog. This is not by any means an easy task as it entails the estimation, jointly, of the translog cost and the 
underlying cost increase due to each inefficiency component. This has been proposed in Kumbhakar (1997) for 
a cost function. Moreover, the proposed formulation opts for an input-oriented technical inefficiency, whilst 
allocative inefficiency is modeled as in Schmidt and Lovell (1979). By doing so, the specification problem is 
solved, yet it remains finding appropriate estimation techniques. The next section solves also this problem as it 
proposes a feasible estimation technique.  
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The crux of the problem is in estimating the cost system in (2) and (3) using the link between 
cost of allocative inefficiency and errors in the cost share equations (which are functions of 
allocative inefficiency), given in equations (6), (8) and (9). It can be seen that the error 
structure based on u and jξ in (2) and (3) is quite complicated. Because of this the model has 
not been estimated using cross-sectional data.5 In the following section, we discuss an 
estimation method. 
 
3.1 Maximum likelihood estimation 
With both technical and allocative inefficiency the system is 
ln ( , )
( , )
AL
ii i i
i i i
ii
C v u
y X X
ζξ ββ β
ηη ξ β
   + +
= + ≡ +   
  
    (10) 
where 2~ . . . (0, )i uu i i d N σ  ( 0)iu ≥  is distributed independently of iv  and iξ . The convolution 
i i iv uω ≡ +  has a familiar distribution, namely,
2( ) i iif
ω λω
ω φ
σ σ σ
   
= Φ   
   
, where 2 2 2v uσ σ σ= + , 
/
u v
λ σ σ= , and ,  φ Φ  denote, respectively the pdf and cdf of the standard normal variable (see 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), p. 140). Consequently, ( | ) ( ln ( , ))ALi i i ip p Cωζ ξ ω ξ β= − .  
Assuming 1~ . . . (0, )i Ji i d Nξ − Ω  as before, we obtain the following joint probability density 
function  
( , ) ( | ) ( ) ( | ( , )) ( ( , )). | det ( , ) |i i i i i i i i i i i ip p p p p Dη ξζ η ζ η η ζ ξ η β ξ η β ξ η β= ⋅ = ⋅  
             
2 ( [ ln ( , ]) | det ( , ) |ALi i i iC Dλσ σ ζ ξ β ξ η β= Φ − ⋅ ×  
2
/ 2 1/ 2 11
22
[ ln ( , )](2 ) det( ) exp ( , ) ( , )
2
AL
J i i
i i
C
e e
ζ ξ β
pi η β η β
σ
− − −
 
− 
′Ω − − Ω 
  
. 
Using  
0
0
, , ,
ln ln ( ) ln ( , ( , ))
( ),   1,..., 1,
a AL
i i i i i i
a
j i j i j i
C C C
S S j J
ζ β β ξ η β
η β
= − −
= − = −
 
                                                        
5 The system described in (2) and (3) is somewhat similar to the panel data model of Kumbhakar and Tsionas 
(2005) model which assumed the presence of additional error terms in the share equations. Integrability 
condition requires that if there are errors in the share equations, these errors should also appear in the cost 
function (McElroy (1987)). No such allowance was made in the Kumbhakar and Tsionas (2005a) model.  
Furthermore, they used a Bayesian approach to estimate the system. Here we propose a classical ML method 
without  an extra error term in each cost share equation. 
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the likelihood function becomes:  
1 1
( , , , ; , )
( [ ln ( , ]) | det ( , ) |
v u
n n
n AL
i i i i
i i
L y X
C Dλσ
β σ σ
σ ζ ξ β ξ η β−
= =
Ω ∝
Φ − − ⋅ ×∏ ∏
 
{ }2/ 2 2 11 122 1 1det( ) exp [ ln ( , )] ( , ) ( , )n nn ALi i i i i ii iC e eσ ζ ξ β η β η β− −= = ′Ω − − − Ω∑ ∑ ,   (11) 
where ( , ) ( , ) ( , )i i i i ie η β ξ η β ξ η β= − , and 1
1
( , ) ( , )ni i i
i
nξ η β ξ η β−
=
= ∑ . The above likelihood function 
can be concentrated with respect to Ω , the ML estimator of which is:  
1
1
ˆ ( ) ( , ) ( , )n i i i i
i
n e eβ η β η β−
=
′Ω = ∑ . 
Thus, the concentrated log-likelihood function is proportional to: 
2
2
1 1
ln ( , , ; , ) ln( ) ln ( [ ln ( , ]) ln | det ( , ) |n nC ALn
v u i i i i
i i
L y X C Dλσβ σ σ σ ζ ξ β ξ η β
= =
= − + Φ − − +∑ ∑  
2
21
2 2 1
ˆˆdet( ( )) [ ln ( , )]n ALn i i
i
C
σ
β ζ ξ β
=
− Ω − −∑ .     (12) 
Here, σ  and λ  are functions of the original parameters 
v
σ  and 
u
σ . The model can be 
generalized so that µ is the mean vector of allocative distortion parameters. This means vector 
can be made function of a vector of exogenous variables, say iz , so we have: 
i izµ = Γ . 
In this way the exogenous variables have an impact on allocative efficiency, which can be 
measured easily (e.g., using elasticities) after the parameters have been estimated by the 
method of ML.  
To allow for determinants of inefficiency we assume 2log ′=ui izσ δ . This model was favored 
over the standard Battese-Coelli / Kumbhakar-Ghosh-McGuckin specification in terms of the 
BIC criterion and it is known to have a number of desirable features (see Kumbhakar and 
Parmeter, 2014). 
To maximize the log-likelihood functions shown in (12) we use the Nelder-Mead simplex 
maximization technique that does not require numerical derivatives. To compute standard 
errors for the parameters we have used the BHHH formula, which is based on first-order 
derivatives of the log-density with respect to the parameters.  
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4. Dataset 
Unconsolidated bank-level data for the estimation of efficiency are obtained from the Fitch 
IBCA-Bankscope database. Our sample cover the period 2005-2010 and includes 
commercial, savings and cooperative banks in EU-15 countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, and the UK). After removing errors and related inconsistencies, as well as banks for 
which we don’t have data for the entire period under examination, we end up with a sample 
of 2,410 banks.6 
We define inputs and outputs in line with the intermediation approach of Sealey and Lindley 
(1977). Outputs include loans and other earning assets (government securities, bonds, equity 
investments, CDs, T-bills, equity investment etc.), while total cost is defined as the sum of 
overheads (personnel and administrative expenses), interest, fees, and commission expenses. 
With regards to input prices, we proxy the price of labour by the ratio of personnel expenses 
to total assets, while we measure the price of deposits as the ratio of total interest expenses to 
total borrowed funds and the price of physical capital as the ratio of other operating expenses 
to fixed assets. Equity is specified as a fixed netput and is included to account for both the 
risk-based capital requirements and the risk-return trade-off that banks face (Färe et al., 
2004). 
 
                                                        
6
 We opt for a balanced sample because our aim is to examine the effect of labour regulation on bank 
performance and we want to keep the number of banks in our sample stable over time so as to avoid our results 
being driven by the entry and exit of banks from our sample (due to data availability, mergers and acquisitions, 
failures etc.). We acknowledge that our sample suffers from “survival bias”, as it includes only the banks that 
have survived over the sample period, which are usually the most efficient ones, and also that this affects the 
average efficiency scores we report, but we consider that this does not affect the main aim of this study, which is 
to examine the effect of institutional framework of labour market regulations on a sample of European banks.     
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4.1 Measuring labour market regulation  
We capture labour market regulations by the Fraser Index of Economic Freedom (Gwartney 
et. al, 2011) and in particular we employ one of the five components of the index, namely, 
labour market liberalization.7 This indicator measures the degree of stringency and the 
distortions associated with labour regulations and institutions, and provides a synthetic 
measure of their anti-competitive implications (European Commission, 2012). The index 
ranges from 0 to 10, with 0 indicating the lowest and 10 the highest degree of liberalization in 
the labour market, respectively.8  
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the Fraser Index on labour regulation (LR) over the period 
2000-2010 for all EU-15 countries. Overall, we observe significant liberalization in European 
labour markets in all EU countries except Luxembourg. In particular, UK and Ireland appear 
to have the most liberalized labour markets, while Ireland is also among the countries that 
exhibit the highest improvement over time. The significant progress observed across EU 
countries in the liberalization of their labour markets is not surprising, as the need to improve 
the functioning of EU labour markets has featured prominently in the priorities of the EU 
strategy.9 For example, the objectives of the Lisbon strategy included policies to promote 
flexibility in the labour market combined with employment security and to reduce labour 
market segmentation, while at the same time ensure employment-friendly labour cost 
                                                        
7 The Fraser Index of Economic Freedom consists of five factors: size of government; legal structure and 
security of property rights; access to sound money; freedom to exchange with foreigners; and regulation of 
credit, labour, and business. These are weighted components that form a composite index ranging from 0 to 10, 
with 0 indicating the lowest and 10 the highest level of economic freedom. The use of this index is common in 
the economic literature (see for example Carlsson and Lundstrom, 2002). 
8
 The data used to construct the Fraser Index and its sub-components are from external sources such as the IMF, 
World Bank, and World Economic Forum that provide data for a large number of countries. These raw data are 
transformed into component ratings, which are then used to construct the scores. Complete methodological 
details can be found in the “Economic Freedom of the World: Annual Report 2012” (Appendix: Explanatory 
Notes and Data Sources (page 271)). 
9
 For a comprehensive review of labour market reforms implemented in EU countries over the last decade, see 
European Commission (2012) and Turrini et al. (2014). 
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developments and wage-setting mechanisms (see Council Decision 2005/600/EC on 
Guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States).  
According to the European Commission (2012): ‘Since the onset of EMU, there was clear 
awareness that a successful monetary union would have required reforming labour markets 
where needed in such a way to ease adjustment in the face of asymmetric shocks and to 
permit a prompt reaction of price competitiveness as a tool to absorb idiosyncratic shocks 
and favour the correction of macroeconomic imbalances.’ The need for timely and 
comprehensive labour market reforms has been further highlighted in the priorities identified 
in EU surveillance, including in the context of the EU Semester, the Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure, and financial assistance programme conditionality for countries under 
IMF/EC/ECB programs. Against the background of an increased urgency to reform labour 
markets, and broadly in line with the recommendations by European institutions, most EU 
countries have stepped up their labour market reform agenda, focusing on reforms of labour 
market institutions and regulation that are key to ensure effective adjustment (Turrini et al., 
2014). According to data from the European Commission (DG ECFIN LABREF database), 
most reforms were undertaken in the areas of active labour market policy and labour taxation, 
while the 2008 crisis has triggered increased policy action in reform areas with macro-
structural relevance, such as employment protection legislation and wage-setting frameworks 
(Turrini et al., 2014). 
Figure 1 also reveals that there appears to be no clear relationship between the initial 
conditions of labour market performance and subsequent reform efforts, which is also 
consistent with the findings of the OECD (Brandt et al., 2005). In addition, according to the 
European Commission (2012) the distribution of reforms across countries reveals that there is 
a relatively low degree of cross-country synchronization of reforms over the examined 
period. 
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 (Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here) 
In our analysis, we also employ the sub-components of the Fraser Index on labour regulation. 
In particular, the index is decomposed into the following factors: i) hiring regulations and 
minimum wage (MW), ii) hiring and firing regulations (HF), iii) centralized collective 
bargaining (CCB), iv) regulation of hours of work (HR), v) mandated cost of worker 
dismissal (DISS) and vi) conscription.10 Note that the sub-components of the labour 
regulation index also take values from 0 to 10, with higher values suggesting greater 
economic freedom and low values indicating the existence of market rigidities. 
In more detail, the first subcomponent of Frazer labour market regulation index, “hiring 
regulations and minimum wage”, focuses on the difficulty of hiring and captures some 
fundamental labour market issues, such as: whether fixed-term contracts allow for permanent 
tasks, the maximum cumulative duration of fixed-term contracts; and the ratio of the 
minimum wage for a trainee or first-time employee to the average value added per worker. 
Looking at Figure 2 (upper left panel) we observe significant differences across countries, 
both with regards to the trend of reforms, as well as their direction and intensity. Most 
countries exhibit a trend towards liberalization of hiring regulations and minimum wage, with 
Austria, Denmark, Ireland and the UK presenting the highest progress over time. On the other 
hand, the opposite trend is observed in France and Portgual.   
The second subcomponent of the Fraser Labour Index is “hiring and firing regulations” and 
captures whether labour market regulations hinder the hiring and firing of workers. Figure 2 
(upper right panel), shows a somewhat slow trend towards greater liberalization in hiring and 
firing regulations in most countries, suggesting that there may be room for additional 
                                                        
10
 We exclude the 6th sub-component of the Fraser Index on labour regulation from our analysis, as we consider 
it less relevant for the banking system.  
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liberalization in this area. Denmark and Finland are the countries exhibiting the highest 
improvement in reforms in this area. 
The third subcomponent of the Fraser Labour Index is “centralized collective bargaining”, 
which refers to country-level industrial relations, and captures whether wages are set by a 
centralized bargaining process or are left up to each individual company. As we can observe 
from Figure 2 (middle left panel), there are diverging trends across countries, with about half 
of EU Member States exhibiting a trend towards higher centralization over time and the other 
half moving towards decentralization. France and Ireland exhibit the highest improvement of 
this sub-component over time, while the UK, although presents a trend towards higher 
centralization, it still remains the country with most liberalized system of collective 
bargaining. 
The fourth subcomponent of the Fraser labour Index, “hours regulations” captures various 
elements including: restrictions on night work; restrictions on weekly holiday work and 
weekly hours, including overtime, and paid annual vacation. Figure 2 (middle right panel), 
shows a trend towards more liberalization over the period 2000-2010 across all countries 
except Greece and Spain, while Ireland presents the highest score in this area (a fully 
liberalized system). 
The “mandated cost of worker dismissal” comprises the fifth subcomponent of the Fraser 
Labour Index and captures the cost of the advance notice requirements, severance payments, 
and penalties due when dismissing a redundant worker. In Figure 2 (down left panel), we 
observe that the vast majority of countries (except from Greece) exhibits significant progress 
in liberalizing mandated dismissal costs over the examined period. Moreover, several 
countries, such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden, have 
a fully liberalized system in this area.  
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4.2 Control Variables 
A number of control variables are also included in our analysis in order to account for 
heterogeneity both across banks and across countries. In particular, the inclusion of variables 
capturing individual bank characteristics that could affect cost efficiency and variables 
accounting for cross-country heterogeneity is common in the efficiency literature (see for 
example, Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000). To this end, the following bank-specific 
variables are included, capturing differences across banks in terms of size, credit risk and 
profitability: 
Bank Size (TA): Although banks in the EU-15 banking systems have similar organizational 
structures and objectives, they vary significantly in size. Therefore, we include the logarithm 
of total assets to account for differences in the size of each bank. Bank size is also a proxy for 
economies or diseconomies of scale and can lead to either higher or lower costs for banks. If 
large banks exercise market power, they may increase the costs for the sector through slack 
and inefficiency. In a similar vein, small banks operating mostly in local markets may have 
access to “soft” information about local conditions, engage in “relationship lending” and 
become more efficient than large banks (Berger, 2007). By contrast, if the size of a bank 
reflects economies of scale and consolidation through the survival of more efficient banks, 
larger banks may be more cost efficient. Empirical evidence on the relationship between bank 
size and efficiency is inconclusive (see Altunbas et al., 2001; Carbo et al., 2002; Maudos and 
De Guevara, 2007). 
Credit risk (LLP/L): Managing credit risk is an important part of bank operations. Changes in 
credit risk may reflect changes in the quality of a bank’s loan portfolio and may affect bank 
performance. As a proxy for credit risk we use the ratio of loan loss provisions to gross loans. 
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The relationship between inefficiency and credit risk could be positive according to the ‘bad 
management’ or the ‘bad luck’ hypotheses developed by Berger and DeYoung (1997), or 
negative under the ‘skimping’ hypothesis.11 
Capitalization (EQ/A): The ratio of equity to assets is a proxy for bank capitalization and also 
accounts for different risk preferences. If financial capital is ignored, the efficiency of banks 
that may be more risk averse than others and may hold a higher level of financial capital 
would be mis-measured, even though they are behaving optimally given their risk 
preferences. The capitalization ratio is thus included in order to account for both the risk-
based capital requirements and the risk-return trade-off that bank owners face.  
Net interest margin (NIM): Despite the rising importance of fee-based income as a proportion 
of total income, net interest margins remain one of the principal elements of bank net cash 
flows and profits. We employ the net interest margin as a traditional measure of bank 
performance, which captures banks’ primary intermediation function, while it also serves as a 
proxy for bank competition.  
 (Insert table 1 about here) 
Moreover, we also include two macroeconomic variables, namely GDP growth (GDPgr) and 
the inflation rate (INFL) as proxies for fluctuations in economic activity across countries and 
over time. This is consistent with the vast majority of the literature (see for example, Dietsch 
and Lozano-Vivas, 2000). Descriptive statistics for the bank-specific and country-specific 
control variables are presented in Table 1, which also includes the average value for the 
labour market indicator and its decomposition for each country over the period 2005-2010. 
                                                        
11
 Under the ‘bad luck’ hypothesis of Berger and DeYoung (1997), exogenous events may cause an increase in a 
bank’s problem loans and the additional managerial effort required to deal with these non-performing loans, will 
increase bank costs. The ‘bad management’ hypothesis assumes that an inefficient bank manager will apply 
poor senior management practices to both day-to-day operations (increased cost inefficiency) and to managing 
the loan portfolio (lower credit quality). Under the ‘skimping’ hypothesis, a bank may appear more cost efficient 
in the short run, if it allocates fewer resources to monitoring loans, as less operating expenses can support the 
same quantity of loans and other outputs. 
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5. Results and discussion 
5.1 Technical and allocative efficiency scores 
Table 2 presents the average technical and allocative efficiency scores by country over the 
period 2005-2010.12 Looking at the cross-country results, average technical efficiency stands 
at 0.84, ranging from 0.77 in Belgium to 0.92 in Finland, while average allocative efficiency 
is estimated at 0.89, ranging from 0.86 in Ireland to 0.91 in Finland.  
Over time (see Figure 3), average technical efficiency remains broadly stable up to 2007 and 
decreases significantly thereafter, following the advent of the global financial crisis. 
Technical efficiency starts improving slightly in 2009 and continues its upward trend also in 
2010. Allocative efficiency exhibits a similar trend, showing a clear downward trend after 
2007, and starts improving in 2010. Cross-country analysis reveals similar patterns in the 
evolution of efficiency scores over time across countries. Looking at the distribution of 
technical and allocative efficiency over time, we observe (Figure 4) that during the financial 
crisis (for the years 2008 and 2009) the distribution of both technical and allocative efficiency 
flattens and moves to the left (to lower efficiency scores). Overall, our efficiency analysis 
shows that the financial crisis has significantly affected banks’ allocative and technical 
efficiency and that some improvement is observed in 2010, which could reflect banks’ 
increasing efforts to cut down their costs.13 
(Insert Table 2 and Figures 3 and 4 about here) 
                                                        
12
 The average efficiency scores presented in Table 2 are derived from equation (12) using the aggregate labour 
index to capture labour market regulations and institutions (Table 3 results). Efficiency results derived from the 
rest of the models presented in this paper (using the sub-components of the aggregate labour index-see tables 4 
and 5) are broadly similar and we do not observe any marked sensitivity of the distributions of technical and 
allocative efficiency. Results are available from the authors upon request.   
13
 The methodology of this paper allows us to derive estimates of both allocative and technical efficiency 
distributions for each individual period in the sample. Thus, the advantage is that any structural change in the 
underlying performance measures due to the credit crunch is dealt adequately from a complete set of 
information  such as the distributions of allocative and technical efficiency per year. 
  
 
20 
 
Figure 5 presents the distribution of price distortions, across the entire sample, for the prices 
of borrowed funds (straight line) and labour (dotted line). These parameters are the ξ’s in 
system (2)-(3). The labour price distortion averages approximately 10% and can be as large 
as about 30-40%. The price distortion of borrowed funds ranges between -20% and 10%, its 
average is close to -5% and there is clearly some heterogeneity of its distribution across 
banks –evidenced by the distinct bimodality of the sample distribution. These results indicate 
that banks effectively face much higher labour costs compared to the nominal prices, while 
most of them buy their borrowed funds cheap. However, there is considerable heterogeneity 
among banks regarding their funding cost, as evidenced by the sizable probability to the right 
of zero in the distribution of borrowed fund distortions. The increased variability in the price 
of borrowed funds across banks could be explained by differences in banks’ business models 
and funding structures across countries and across banks of different size and with different 
institutional characteristics (ECB, 2009).  
(Insert Figures 5 and 6 about here) 
In Figure 6, we present the sample distributions of price distortions for borrowed funds 
(upper panel) and labour (bottom panel). We observe that the distributions clearly change 
over time. For example, after the sub-prime crisis borrowed funds become more expensive, 
while wage costs decrease from about 10% or 15% in previous periods to about 5% on the 
average in 2010. This is consistent with the effect of the global financial crisis on banks’ 
funding cost, which has increased significantly, putting an end to a period of ample liquidity 
observed prior to the crisis (ECB, 2009). Similarly, the ramifications of the financial crisis for 
executives’ compensations and for the financial sector’s employees’ salaries are possibly 
evident in the fall in labour costs. 
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In addition, it is, perhaps, of interest to disentangle the effects of various inputs on allocative 
inefficiency as the focus of this study is on labour regulation. To perform this decomposition, 
apparently, we cannot regress allocative inefficiency scores on different input distortions as 
according to (4)-(8) our model relies on consistent measurement of technical and allocative 
inefficiency.  
One may think that we can re-estimate the model assuming certain distortions are zero. New 
allocative efficiency scores can be computed. These new scores can then be compared to 
allocative efficiency scores from the general model. The problem, however, is that if the 
general model is correct (which is obvious as it nests all the alternatives where certain 
distortions are zero) estimates of distortions and scores will be biased.  
The proper way to proceed is as follows. Given the distortions arising from borrowed funds, 
labor and capital (denoted by , ,
B L K
ξ ξ ξ ) and the estimated model, denote allocative 
efficiency by AE . We can set 0
L
ξ = , say. Next, we compute allocative efficiency scores 
denoted by 
o
AE  using (6). The ratio: 
 
0
AE AE
AE
−
∆ = ,  
is a measure of the contribution of labor to allocative efficiency. In other words, ∆ measures 
by how much allocative efficiency can be improved if labor input was used efficiently. We 
present estimates for labour and borrowed funds in the following table. 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
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5.2 The impact of aggregate labour regulation index 
Table 4 presents the output from estimating Eq. (12) on the relationship between bank 
efficiency (both technical and allocative) and labour market regulation using the aggregate 
labour market regulation index.  
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
Our results indicate that the relationship between labour market liberalization and bank 
efficiency is a complex one. On the one hand, we observe a negative relationship between 
labour market liberalization and technical efficiency, which is marginally statistically 
significant at the 10% level in line with Hypothesis 1, while the effect of labour market 
liberalization on allocative efficiency appears to be positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. Our findings are in line with the mixed 
evidence that the labour economics literature provides with regard to the impact of labour 
regulation on economic performance (Bassanini et al., 2009). The negative relationship 
between technical efficiency and labour liberalization seems to be consistent with the positive 
effects of employment protection on employees’ incentives to invest in firm-specific 
knowledge, improving their productivity (Black and Lynch, 1996; Bassanini et al., 2009). 
Moreover, specific to the banking sector, a higher degree of labour market liberalization that 
increases turnover and labour mobility, may negatively impact on ‘relationship lending’ in 
banking, which is based on the personal interaction and relationship between customers and 
bank employees, thus negatively affecting technical efficiency.  
On the other hand, the positive effect of labour liberalization on allocative efficiency 
indicates that less restrictive labour market regulations reduce the cost of labour for banks 
and the cost of adjusting the labour input, leading to higher efficiency. This is consistent with 
Lafontaine and Sivadasan (2007), who find a significant impact of labour laws on labour 
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adjustment and related decisions at the micro level. In particular, our finding indicates that in 
a more liberalized labour market, banks are able to respond more efficiently to changes in the 
price of labour and to adjust their labour input accordingly. This positive relationship 
between allocative efficiency and labour market liberalization is also consistent with the 
findings of  Scarpetta and Tressel (2004), who found evidence that high labour adjustment 
costs (proxied by the strictness of employment protection legislation) can have a strong 
negative impact on productivity, as they reduce incentives for innovation and adoption of 
new technologies.  
Looking at the effect of bank-specific variables on technical and allocative efficiency, our 
results are consistent with the literature. More specifically, we observe that bank size has a 
positive effect on both technical and allocative efficiency, while banks with a higher capital 
ratio exhibit higher technical efficiency, but lower allocative efficiency. The ratio of loan loss 
provisions to loans, which captures credit risk and the quality of banks’ loan portfolio, 
exhibits a negative relationship with bank technical efficiency, which is consistent with the 
‘bad management hypothesis’ of Berger and DeYoung (1997), while it has a positive 
coefficient in the case of allocative efficiency, consistent with the ‘skimping hypothesis’ (see 
Berger and DeYoung, 1997). The net interest margin appears to assert a negative effect on 
technical efficiency, while it affects positively allocative efficiency. Finally, regarding the 
macroeconomic variables, we find that the coefficient of GDP growth is only statistically 
significant in the case of allocative efficiency and takes a positive sign, while inflation 
appears to have a negative and statistically significant effect in both specifications. 
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5.3 The impact of sub-components of labour regulation 
As a next step and in order to get a more accurate assessment of the effect of labour market 
regulation on bank performance, we decompose the aggregate labour regulation index into its 
different components, which are, in turn, grouped into two categories. The first category 
incorporates the indicators with a direct effect on the price of labour (i.e. the minimum wage, 
the cost of dismissals) that are expected to have an impact on banks’ allocative efficiency 
through their ability to respond to changes in input prices. The second category of indicators 
includes variables that affect the general institutional setting in the labour market and banks’ 
ability to adjust the input of labour (i.e. hiring and firing regulations, centralized collective 
bargaining and mandated hours worked) and are expected to have an impact on banks’ 
technical efficiency. Tables 5 and 6 present the estimated results for allocative and technical 
efficiency, respectively. 
(Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here) 
Table 5 shows that there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between 
allocative efficiency and the sub-components of the labour regulation index that affect the 
price of labour, in line with Hypothesis 1. This relationship is confirmed in all specifications 
(models 1-3 in Table 5). In particular, we find that the dismissal cost sub-index has a negative 
and statistically significant effect on allocative efficiency. According to Cappelli (2000) 
increased dismissal costs that raise the costs of workforce adjustment, may reduce incentives 
for firms to expand and innovate, thus affecting their cost performance. In particular, hiring 
and firing costs increase labour adjustment costs and create disincentives for firms to foster 
internal efficiency through the adoption of leading technologies and innovation (see e.g., 
Audretsch and Thurik, 2001). 
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Moreover, the coefficient for the minimum wage sub-component also asserts a negative and 
statistically significant effect on allocative efficiency. Our results are consistent with Agell 
(1999), who argues that significant employment security together with a compressed wage 
structure stimulates investment in education by workers, with positive effects on their 
productivity by providing workers with insurance against wage risk. Lower wage risk could 
also have a positive effect on ‘relationship lending’ in banking, thus positively affecting bank 
efficiency through improved personal relationships between customers and bank employees. 
Our results are further confirmed when looking at models 2 and 3, where we examine the 
separate effect of each subcomponent of the labour regulation index. Both the coefficients of 
the minimum wage sub-component and the dismissal cost sub-index retain their sign and 
significance. Regarding the remaining bank-specific and macro variables, they all take the 
expected signs and confirm our previous findings. On the other hand, when looking at the 
results for technical efficiency (Table 6), we find that the relationship between technical 
efficiency and the sub-components of the labour regulation index that affect banks’ ability to 
adjust their labour input is not statistically significant in any of the specifications (models 1-4 
in table 6).  
These results are of interest as they provide for the first time insights into the relationship 
between specific aspects of labour regulation and bank performance. In particular, the 
analysis of the sub-components of the labour market regulation index provides evidence that 
labour market regulations that affect the price of labour significantly affect bank performance 
through the channel of allocative efficiency. On the other hand, there appears to be no strong 
evidence of a significant relationship with technical efficiency.  
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6. Conclusion  
The labour economics literature provides mixed evidence regarding the impact of labour 
regulation on economic performance of firms, whilst the bank performance literature has so 
far neglected to examine the importance of labour regulation. This paper fills this gap in the 
literature and examines the impact of labour regulation on technical and allocative efficiency 
of the EU-15 banking system over the period 2005-2010. In particular, we employ the Fraser 
index for labour regulation and its sub-components and propose a novel methodology based 
on Kumbhakar and Tsionas (2005) to investigate the relationship between labour market 
liberalization and technical and allocative efficiency in European banking. 
Overall, our evidence shows that the relationship between bank efficiency and labour market 
regulation is complex. We find that labour market regulation affects bank efficiency mainly 
through the allocative efficiency channel, while its effect on technical efficiency is not 
significant. More specifically, we find a positive effect of labour market liberalization on 
allocative efficiency, which is consistent with the findings of Autor et al., (2007) and 
Lafontaine and Sivadasan (2007). However, when looking at the various sub-components of 
the labour market regulation index, we find that diverging forces are at play. In particular, we 
observe that the liberalization of the minimum wage regulations and of the cost of dismissals 
has a negative effect on allocative efficiency. Moreover, our results indicate that insurance 
against wage risk and job security in general, as reflected by a lower level of labour market 
liberalization, can have a positive effect on ‘relationship lending’ in banking, with positive 
effects on bank efficiency through improved personal relationships between customers and 
bank employees. Regarding policy implications, our findings clearly demonstrate the 
complex relationship between efficiency and labour market regulations and the need for 
policy makers to take these complex interactions into consideration when designing labour 
market reforms.  
  
 
27 
 
References 
Agell, J., 1999. On the benefits from rigid labor markets: Norms, market failures and social 
insurance. Economic Journal 108, 143-164. 
 
Altunbas, Y., Gardener, E.P.M., Molyneux, P., Moore, B., 2001. Efficiency in European 
banking. European Economic Review 45, 1931-1955. 
 
Audretsch, D.B., Thurik, R., 2001. Linking entrepreneurship to growth. OECD STI Working 
Papers - 2001/2, OECD, Paris. 
 
Auer, P., 2007. In search of optimal labor market institutions.  Economic and Labor Market 
Analysis Papers 3, Geneva: ILO. 
 
Autor, D.H., Kerr, W.R., Kugler, A.D., 2007. Does employment protection reduce 
productivity? Evidence from US States. Economic Journal 117, 189–217. 
 
Bassanini, A., Ernst, E., 2002. Labor market regulation, industrial relations and technological 
regimes. Industrial and Corporate Change 11(3), 391–426. 
 
Bassanini, A., Nunziata, L., Venn D., 2009. Job protection legislation and productivity 
growth in OECD countries. Economic Policy 58, 349-402. 
 
Berger, A.N., 2007. International comparisons of banking efficiency. Financial Markets 
Institutions and Instruments 16, 119-43. 
 
Berger, A.N., DeYoung, R., 1997. Problem loans and cost efficiency in commercial banks. 
Journal of Banking and Finance 21, 849-870. 
 
Bertola, G., 2009. Labor market regulation: Motives, measures, effects. Conditions of Work 
and Employment Series No. 21, International Labor Office. 
 
Besley, T., Burgess, R., 2004. Can labor regulation hinder economic performance? Evidence 
from India. Quarterly Journal of Economics CXIX, 91-134.  
 
Black, S.E., Lynch, L.M., 1996. Human-capital investments and productivity. The American 
Economic Review 86, 263−267. 
 
Blanchard, O., Wolfers, J., 2000. The role of shocks and institutions in the rise of European 
unemployment: Aggregate evidence. Economic Journal CX, 1-33. 
 
Boeri, T., Helppie B., Macis, M., 2008. Labor regulations in developing countries: A review 
of the evidence and directions for future research. Social Protection Discussion Papers No. 
0833, World Bank. 
 
Boeri, T., van Ours, J., 2008. The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets. Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Botero, J.C., Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2004. The 
regulation of labor. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 1339-82. 
  
 
28 
 
 
Brandt, N.., Burniaux, J., Duval, R., 2005. Assessing the OECD jobs strategy: Past 
developments and reforms. OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 429, OECD 
Publishing. 
 
Cappelli, P., 2000. Examining the incidence of downsizing and its effect on establishment 
performance. In D. Neumark (ed.), On the Job, New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Carbo, S., Gardener, E.P.M., Williams, J., 2002. Efficiency in banking: Empirical evidence 
from the savings banking sector. The Manchester School 70 (2), 204-228. 
 
Carlsson, F., Lundstrom, S., 2002. Economic freedom and growth: Decomposing the Effects. 
Public Choice 112, 335-344. 
 
Council of the European Union Decision 2005/600/EC (2005) TEEC, OJ L 205. 
 
Deakin, S., Sarkar, P., 2008. Assessing the long-run economic impact of labor law systems: 
A theoretical reappraisal and analysis of new time series data. Industrial Relations Journal 39, 
453-487. 
 
Dietsch, M., Lozano-Vivas, A., 2000. How the environment determines banking efficiency: 
A comparison between French and Spanish industries. Journal of Banking and Finance 24, 
985-1004. 
 
European Central Bank, 2003. Structural analysis of the EU banking sector: Year 2002. ECB, 
November 2003. 
 
European Central Bank, 2009. EU banks’ funding structures and policies. ECB, May 2009. 
 
European Central Bank, 2013. Financial Stability Review. ECB, May 2013. 
 
European Commission, 2012. Labor market developments in Europe 2012. European 
Economy 5/2012. 
 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S., Weber, W., 2004. The effect of risk-based capital requirements on 
profit efficiency in banking. Applied Economics 36, 1731–1743. 
 
Farrell, M.J., 1957. The Measurement of Productive Efficiency. Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society 120, 253-81.  
 
Freeman, R.B., 1988. Labor market institutions and economic performance. Economic Policy 
VI, 64-80. 
 
Gwartney J.D., Hall J.C., Lawson R., 2011. Economic freedom of the world: 2011 Annual 
Report. Vancouver, BC: The Fraser Institute. Data retrieved from www.freetheworld.com. 
 
Heckman, J., Pages, C., 2003. Law and employment: Lessons from Latin America and the 
Caribbean. NBER Working Papers 10129, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
  
 
29 
 
Kumbhakar, S.C., 1997. Modeling Allocative Inefficiency in a Translog Cost Function and 
Cost Share Equations: An Exact Relationship. Journal of Econometrics 76, 351-356. 
 
Kumbhakar, S.C., Lovell, C.A.K., 2000. Stochastic Frontier Analysis. Cambridge University 
Press, New York. 
 
Kumbhakar, S.C., Parmeter, C.F., 2014. Efficiency Analysis: A Primer on Recent Advances, 
Foundations and Trends in Econometrics: Vol. 7: No. 3–4, pp 191-385. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0800000023. 
 
Kumbhakar, S.C., Tsionas, E.G., 2005. The Joint Measurement of Technical and Allocative 
Inefficiencies: An Application of Bayesian Inference in Nonlinear Random-Effects Models. 
Journal of American Statistical Association 100, 736-747. 
 
Kumbhakar, S.C., Tsionas, E.G., 2005a. Measuring Technical and Allocative Inefficiency in 
the Translog Cost System: A Bayesian Approach. Journal of Econometrics 126, 355-384. 
 
Lafontaine, F., Sivadasan, J., 2007. The microeconomic implications of input market 
regulations: Cross-country evidence from within the firm. IPC Working Paper Series No. 22, 
International Policy Center, University of Michigan. 
 
Lazear, E., 1990. Job security provisions and employment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 
105, 699-726. 
 
Malcomson, J.M., 1997. Contracts, hold-up and labor markets. Journal of Economic 
Literature 35, 1917–57. 
 
Mamatzakis, E. Kalyvas, A., Piesse, J., 2013. Does Regulation in Credit, Labour and 
Business Matter for Bank Performance in the EU-10 Economies? International Journal of the 
Economics of Business 20, No. 3. 
 
Maudos, J., De Guevara, J.F. 2007. The cost of market power in banking: Social welfare loss 
vs. cost inefficiency. Journal of Banking and Finance 31 (7), 2103-2125. 
 
McElroy, M., 1987. Additive General Error Models for Production, Cost, and Derived 
Demand or Share System. Journal of Political Economy 95, 738-57.  
 
Nickell, S., 1997. Unemployment and labor market rigidities: Europe versus North America. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives XI, 55-74. 
 
Nickell, S., Layard, R., 1999. Labor market institutions and economic performance. In: 
Ashenfelter, O., Card, D., (Eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3. North Holland, 
Amsterdam. 
 
OECD, 2004. Employment Protection Regulation and Labour Market Performance. OECD 
Employment Outlook, OECD Publishing. 
 
OECD, 2010. Bank profitability: Financial statements of banks. OECD banking statistics 
2000-2009, OECD Publishing. 
 
  
 
30 
 
Scarpetta, S., Tressel, T., 2004. Boosting productivity via innovation and adoption of new 
technologies: Any role for labor market institutions? World Bank Research Working Paper 
3273, Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Schmidt, P., Lovell, C.A.K., 1979. Estimating Technical and Allocative Inefficiency Relative 
to Stochastic Production and Cost Frontiers. Journal of Econometrics 9, 343-66. 
 
Sealey, C., Lindley, J., 1977. Inputs, outputs and a theory of production and cost of 
depository financial institutions. Journal of Finance 32, 1251-266. 
 
Storm, S., Naastepad, C.W.M., 2009. Labor market regulation and productivity growth: 
Evidence for twenty OECD countries (1984-2004). Industrial Relations 48, 629-654. 
 
Tsionas, E., Kumbhakar, S.C., 2006. Estimation of Technical and Allocative Inefficiencies in 
a Cost System: An Exact Maximum Likelihood Approach, MPRA Paper 20173, University 
Library of Munich, Germany. 
 
Turrini, A., Koltay, G., Pierini, F., Goffard, C., Kiss A., 2014. A Decade of Labour Market 
Reforms in the EU: Insights from the LABREF database. European Economy, Economic 
Papers 522, July 2014. 
  
  
 
 
Figure 1: Fraser Index 
Source: Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom Network. 
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Figure 2: Fraser Index – sub-components of the labour regulation index in the EU (2000-2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fraser Institute, Economic Freedom Network. Note: Data for Fraser Index – Mandated cost of dismissal are for 2002 for all 
countries. Data for Luxembourg are for 2003 (due to data availability issues). 
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Figure 3: Technical and allocative efficiency in the EU (2005-2010) 
 
Note: Authors’ estimations, median efficiency scores are reported.  
 
 
Figure 4: Technical and allocative efficiency in the EU by time. 
 
Note: Authors’ estimations.  
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Figure 5: Sample distributions of distortions of inputs 
 
 
Note: Authors’ estimations.  
 
Figure 6: Sample distributions of input price distortions over time 
 
 
Note: Authors’ estimations.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the period 2005-2010 
 
  Labour regulation Bank-specific Control Variables Macro  
  LR-FR MW-FR HF-FR CCB-FR HR-FR DISS-FR LLP/L EQ/A NIM TA GDPgr INFL Obs 
Austria 6.08 9.82 4.17 2.57 7.13 9.87 0.83 7.87 2.29 3.85 1.58 1.90 846 
Belgium 6.97 8.90 2.97 4.22 6.67 9.00 0.40 7.45 2.06 24.61 1.33 2.17 96 
Denmark 7.47 10.00 8.00 5.73 8.00 10.00 1.18 12.92 3.60 11.32 0.42 2.07 312 
Finland 5.18 5.03 4.35 3.70 6.67 8.40 0.17 7.71 1.17 71.24 1.28 1.72 24 
France 5.62 3.30 2.70 6.48 4.00 7.30 0.43 9.10 2.21 57.94 0.85 1.55 666 
Germany 4.38 6.70 2.53 3.23 5.80 4.40 0.88 6.50 2.59 2.28 1.32 1.58 8124 
Greece 4.40 5.78 3.17 3.60 3.53 7.63 1.03 7.98 2.92 26.16 0.52 3.28 78 
Ireland 7.63 8.90 4.30 4.12 10.00 8.48 3.46 5.01 1.67 94.03 0.90 1.65 30 
Italy 6.45 6.05 2.63 3.67 6.67 9.60 0.57 11.53 3.01 5.63 -0.02 1.93 2880 
Lux. 5.55 2.93 3.80 5.95 4.00 6.60 0.69 6.72 1.11 10.62 2.48 2.27 144 
Netherlands 6.68 7.77 3.27 4.17 6.00 8.93 0.44 7.72 1.78 161.21 1.50 1.58 60 
Portugal 5.17 5.77 2.50 5.62 5.53 1.43 0.52 6.18 1.70 28.97 0.52 1.83 66 
Spain 5.13 2.20 2.82 5.27 5.67 4.93 0.55 9.06 2.35 30.46 1.35 2.55 486 
Sweden 5.38 7.23 2.95 3.48 6.00 8.40 0.32 14.04 2.84 10.29 1.97 1.37 360 
UK 8.20 8.90 5.38 7.92 8.67 8.33 1.26 9.60 2.07 122.81 0.97 2.62 288 
EU-15 5.19 6.55 2.88 3.71 6.06 6.30 0.78 8.20 2.62 10.79 1.04 1.75 14460 
Note: Figures are in means over the period 2005-2010. LR = aggregate labour market regulations index; MW: hiring and minimum wage regulation, HF: hiring and firing 
regulation, CCB: centralized collective bargaining, DISS: dismissal cost, HR: hours regulations. Higher values for labour regulation imply a more liberal regulatory environment. 
LLP/L=loan loss provisions to loans ratio (in %). EQ/A= equity to total assets (in %); NIM= net interest margin (in %); TA= total assets in billion euros. GDPgr=GDP growth; 
INFL= inflation rate. Obs= number of observations. Sources: Fitch-IBCA database for all bank-specific variables and own estimations and the 2011 version of the Fraser Index of 
Economic Freedom for labour regulation variables, World Development Indicators Database by the World Bank for all macroeconomic variables. 
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Table 2: Technical and allocative efficiency scores 
  TEFF AEFF 
Austria 0.8817 0.8933 
Belgium 0.7662 0.8971 
Denmark 0.8710 0.8927 
Finland 0.9192 0.9140 
France 0.8629 0.8900 
Germany 0.8843 0.8926 
Greece 0.8041 0.8775 
Ireland 0.8020 0.8626 
Italy 0.8888 0.8763 
Lux. 0.8006 0.8928 
Netherlands 0.8335 0.8978 
Portugal 0.8460 0.8810 
Spain 0.8374 0.8725 
Sweden 0.8155 0.8978 
UK 0.8204 0.8869 
EU-15 0.8422 0.8883 
Note: Authors’ estimations. Figures are in means over the period 2005-2010. TEFF: 
Technical Efficiency; AEFF: Allocative Efficiency.  
 
Table 3: Disentangling allocative inefficiency due to inefficient use of labour and 
borrowed funds by country, ∆ (%) 
        Labour  Borrowed funds  
Austria 19.25 14.50 
Belgium 27.22 15.35 
Denmark 12.45 16.16 
Finland 15.35 18.16 
France 25.67 17.89 
Germany 11.81 15.16 
Greece 57.12 42.16 
Ireland 45.45 23.18 
Italy 30.12 21.12 
Lux. 17.15 15.45 
Netherlands 16.22 18.12 
Portugal 38.35 22.34 
Spain 39.22 25.31 
Sweden 19.12 12.12 
UK 16.56 11.17 
EU-15 38.12 17.25 
Note: Authors’ estimations. For EU-15 the ∆ measure was calculated assuming a 
simultaneous reduction in the distortion factors for all countries. Therefore, this is not an 
average. 
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Table 4: Technical and allocative efficiency and aggregate labour market regulation   
TECHNICAL EFF ALLOCATIVE EFF 
constant 0.517***      0.617***      
  (0.0156)        (0.0441)        
LR 
-0.073*      0.256***      
  (0.04)      (0.0217)        
GDPgr 0.00416    0.0202***    
  (0.0177)        (0.000151)        
INFL 
-0.0036    -0.03313***     
  (0.0021)       (0.00187)       
lnTA 0.0044*    0.0003***    
  (0.0023)        (0.00011)        
NIM 
-0.0015***    0.0033***    
  (0.00018)       (0.0012)        
EQ/A 0.0017***  -0.00015***    
  (0.00022)        (0.00001)      
LLP/L 0.0015***    -0.0026***    
(0.00022)        (0.00019)       
Note: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. S.E. are in parentheses. 
Standard errors are derived from the sandwich estimator of the covariance matrix of the ML estimator. 
  
 
Table 5: Allocative efficiency and labour market regulation (disaggregated)  
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
constant 0.874*** 0.877*** 0.881*** 
  (0.00415) (0.0315) (0.0182) 
MW-FR 
-0.0554*** -0.0447***  
  (0.00718) (0.0042)  
DISS-FR 
-0.0570***  -0.0628*** 
  (0.00414)  (0.0025) 
GDPgr 0.0116*** 0.0116*** 0.0255*** 
  (0.0005) (0.00011) (0.00035) 
INFL 
-0.032*** -0.0295*** -0.0305*** 
  (0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0044) 
lnTA 0.000337 0.000393*** 0.00142*** 
  (0.0002) (0.000102) (0.00036) 
NIM 0.00281 0.00285*** 0.00151*** 
  (0.0027) (0.000262) (0.00042) 
EQ/A 
-0.0004*** -0.00025*** -0.00044*** 
  (0.0001) (0.00001) (0.00003) 
LLP/L 
-0.0025*** -0.00261*** -0.00355*** 
(0.00022) (0.00022) (0.00027) 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. S.E. are in parentheses. 
Standard errors are derived from the sandwich estimator of the covariance matrix of the ML estimator. 
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Table 6: Technical efficiency and labour market regulation (disaggregated)  
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
constant 0.661***      0.681***      0.681***      0.6723***      
  (0.0241)        (0.0177)        (0.0177)        (0.0163)        
 
    
 
 
 
  
HF-FR 0.0215     0.0088       
  (0.218)        (0.117)          
CCB-FR 0.0145    0.061      
  (0.118)        (0.125)         
HR-FR 0.0230     0.0214     
  (0.0491)         (0.337)        
GDPgr 0.00335    0.0032    0.0029 0.0032 
  (0.0227)        (0.0454)        (0.0388)        (0.0215)        
INFL 
-0.0035    -0.0041    -0.0038    -0.0035    
  (0.0454)       (0.171)       (0.161)       (0.177)       
lnTA 0.00361    0.00291 0.00117 0.00128 
  (0.0447)        (0.220)        (0.181)        (0.100)        
NIM 
-0.00143   -0.0016    -0.0019    -0.0021    
  (0.0187)       (0.0841)       (0.0723)       (0.0815)       
EQ/A 0.002157***  0.00313    0.0022    0.0025    
  (0.00011)        (0.0185)        (0.0140)        (0.0217)        
LLP/L 0.00154***  0.00150    0.00162    0.00155    
(0.0008891)        (0.116) (0.202)        (0.335)        
Note: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. S.E. are in parentheses. Standard errors 
are derived from the sandwich estimator of the covariance matrix of the ML estimator. 
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Appendix A: Derivation of the likelihood function in the presence of only allocative 
inefficiency 
Since the error vector is ( , ) 'i iε η , for the ML method one has to derive the joint pdf of ( , ) 'i iε η  
starting from the distributions on iv  and iξ .  For ML, we need to derive the joint pdf of 
( , ) 'i iε η , that is |( , ) ( | ) ( )i i i i ip p pε η ηε η ε η η=  where 2| ~ (ln ( ( ), ), )ALi i i i vN Cε η ξ η β σ  and ( )i iξ η  is the 
solution of iξ  in terms of iη  from ( , )i i iη η ξ β= . Furthermore, the pdf of ( )ipη η  can be expressed 
as 
( ) ( ( )). | det ( ) |i i i i ip p Dη ξη ξ η ξ η= ,       (A.1) 
where ( )i iDξ η  is the Jacobian matrix (derivatives of iξ  with respect to iη ). Therefore, the joint 
pdf of the error vector in (11) is 
/ 2 2 1/ 2 1/ 2
|
2
11
22
( , ) ( | ) ( ) (2 ) ( ) det( )
[ (ln ( ( )]
exp ( , ) ( , ) | det ( ) |
2
J
i i i i i v
AL
i i i
i i i i i i
v
p p p
C
e e D
ε η ηε η ε η η pi σ
ξ ξ η η β η β ξ η
σ
− − −
−
= = Ω ×
 
− 
′− − Ω 
  
   
 (A.2) 
where ( , ) ( , )i i i ie η β ξ η β µ= − , and µ is the mean vector of allocative distortion parameters.  
In practice, to implement the likelihood function based on (A.2) we have to show that (i) ξ  
can be solved in terms of η , and (ii) the Jacobian matrix can be derived analytically. We 
show these next. 
For notational simplicity now we drop the observation index i . The first task is to solve for ξ  
in terms of η . Note that:  
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0a
j j jS Sη = −
0
1
[1 exp( )]
exp( )
J
j j jk k
k
j
S G
G
ξ β ξ
ξ
=
− + ∑
=
 
0 0
1
( ) exp( ) Jj j j j jk k
k
S G Sη ξ β ξ
=
⇒ + = + ∑  
0 0
1 2
exp( ) J Jaj j j jk k j jk k
k k
S G S Sξ β ξ β ξ
= =
⇒ = + = +∑ ∑ , 1,...,j J= .                (A.3) 
For the last equality we used the normalization 1 0ξ = . The equations in (A.3) can be expressed 
in ratio form to generate the following system of nonlinear equations,  
0
2
0
2
exp( )
J
j jk k
k
j j J
J Jk k
k
S
S
β ξ
λ ξ
β ξ
=
=
+ ∑
=
+ ∑
, 2,...,j J= ,          (A.4) 
where 1/a aj jS Sλ = . In Appendix B we use fixed point arguments to show that a solution of jξ  
exists and is unique. Once the jξ s are obtained, the value of G  can be obtained as 
0
*1 1
2 1
1 1
J
k k
k
a a
S SG
S S
β ξ
=
+ ∑
= = . Note that we need G  to compute ln ( , )AL iC ξ β .  
The second task is to derive the Jacobian of the transformation from ξ  to η . To compute it 
we start again from the definition of jη , i.e., 
0
2
(1 ) Jj j ik k
k
j
j
S h
h
β ξ
η =
− + ∑
= , 2,...,j J= , where exp( )j jh G ξ= . Differentiating it with respect 
to lη  gives: 
ja k k
j jl j jk
k kk l l
h
h S ξ ξδ βξ η η
∂ ∂ ∂
+ =∑ ∑∂ ∂ ∂
,       
 (A.5) 
where jlδ  is the Kronecker delta. The system in (A.5) can be written as: 
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D MΘ = ,       (A.6) 
where jajk j jk
k
h
S βξ
∂
Θ = −
∂
, 
k
kj
j
D
ξ
η
∂
=
∂
, 2( ,..., )JM diag h h= − . Here, D  (the short form of ( )j jDξ η ) is 
the Jacobian of the transformation. The solution of D from (A.6) is 1D M−= Θ , and 
1
2
det( ) det( ) J jjD h
−
=
= Θ ∏ . To evaluate the components of Θ  we obtain 
exp( )j jk j
k k
h G Gδ ξξ ξ
∂  ∂
= + ∂ ∂ 
, , 2,...,j k J= , 
*exp( ) exp( )km m k k
mk
G Sβ ξ ξξ
∂
= − − −∑∂
, 2,...,k J= , 
with the understanding that all the previous expressions are evaluated at the solution of the 
system which is ( )ξ ξ η= . Thus, the solution for the ith observation can be written as 
( , )i i iξ ξ η β= , and the likelihood function is 
{ }2
/ 2 2 / 2 / 2
2 11 1
22 1 1 1
( , , ; , ) (2 ) ( ) det( )
exp [ ln ( , ( , )] ( , ) ( , ) | det ( , ) |
v
Jn n n
v v
nn nAL
i i i i i i i i i
i i i
L y X
C e e D
σ
β σ pi σ
ε β ξ η β η β η β ξ η β
− − −
−
= = =
Ω = Ω ×
′
− − − Ω∑ ∑ ∏
 (A.7) 
where ( , ) ( , )i i i ie η β ξ η β µ= − . 
The ML estimators of 2vσ , µ  and Ω  are: 
2 1 2
1
( ) [ (ln ( ( , )]n AL
v i i i
i
n Cσ β ε ξ η β−
=
= −∑% , 
1
1
( ) ( ) ( )n i
i
nµ β ξ β ξ β−
=
= ≡∑ %% , 
1
1
( ) [ ( ) ( )][ ( ) ( ))]n i i
i
nβ ξ β ξ β ξ β ξ β−
=
′Ω = − −∑ % %% ,    
where ( ) ( , )i i iξ β ξ η β≡% % , and iη%  is the cost share residual vector. In fact, in this study we want to 
make allocative inefficiency function of a vector of exogenous variables, say iz , so we have: 
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i izµ = Γ , 
and we do not use the estimator ( )µ β% ; therefore, we have ( ) ( )i iξ β ξ β µ≡ = . 
The concentrated log-likelihood function is: 
2
1
ln ( ; , ) const. ( / 2) ln ( ) ( / 2) ln(det( ( ))) ln | det ( , ) |nC
v i i
i
L y X n n Dβ σ β β ξ η β
=
= − − Ω +∑% %% .  (A.8) 
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Appendix B: Existence and uniqueness of solution to the system of equations 
Theorem: If (B1) the actual share 0aiS >  for all {1,..., }i J∈ =Z , (B2) for every i ∈Z , we have (
0ijβ ≠  for some j ∈Z ), where ijβ  represents the second-order translog coefficients with 
respect to prices, (B3) 0jkj β∈ =∑Z , and (B4) 
0 1jj
S
∈
=∑
Z
, then  (i) there exists a solution of ξ in the 
system of equations in (14), and (ii) the solution is unique. 
Proof: Before proving the existence and uniqueness, we note that the condition in (B1) 
follows from the definition of cost shares, while that in (B2) is necessary for flexibility of the 
translog cost function. Finally, the conditions (B3) and (B4) follow from homogeneity (of 
degree one in input prices) of the cost function. 
(i) Existence. 
The system in (14) is of the form 0exp( )aj j j jk k
k
S G Sξ β ξ
∈
= + ∑
Z
, j ∈Z . Note that here we are 
considering the system in which the homogeneity restrictions are not directly imposed by 
expressing all prices and cost relative to one input price. Let exp( )aj j jS Gκ ξ= , j ∈Z , so that 
ln ln lnaj j jS Gκ ξ= + + , j ∈Z . Then the system in (14) can be written in the form 
0 0ln ln ln ln lna aj j jk k jk k jk j jk k jk k
k k k k k
S S G S Sκ β β κ β β β κ
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
= − + − = − +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
Z Z Z Z Z
, j ∈Z .     (B.1) 
 such that  1jj κ∈ =∑Z . Then { | 1}
n
jj
κ κ κ+
∈
∈ ≡ ∈ =∑
Z
S , the unit simplex in n . Write the residual 
from the cost share system (3) as: 
0( ) ln lnaj j j jk k jk k
k k
f S Sκ κ β β κ
∈ ∈
= − + −∑ ∑
Z Z
, j ∈Z .                      (B.2) 
Define the mapping: 
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2
2
( )( )
1 ( )
j j
j
k
k
f
g f
κ κ
κ
κ
∈
+
=
+ ∑
Z
, j ∈Z . 
Clearly, :g →S S , i.e., it maps S  into itself and is continuous. By Brouwer's fixed point 
theorem, there exists a *κ ∈S  such that * *( )g κ κ= , which implies that: 
* 2 * * 2( ) ( )j j k
k
f fκ κ κ
∈
= ∑
Z
, j ∈Z . 
Multiplying both sides by *( )jf κ  and summing over j  we obtain: 
* 3 * * * 2( ) ( ) ( )j j j kj j kf f fκ κ κ κ∈ ∈ ∈=∑ ∑ ∑Z Z Z . 
Suppose *( ) 0jf κ =  for all j l≠  but *( ) 0lf κ ≠ . Then the above equation implies 
* 3 * * 3( ) ( )l l lf fκ κ κ= , which gives * 0lκ = . Write * *exp( )al l lSκ ξ= . By assumption (B1) since * 0lκ =  
we have *lξ = −∞ . For * 0lκ =  by (B.2) we obtain *( )jf κ = ±∞  for some j ∈Z  provided 
assumption (B2) holds. Now, 
* * 2
* *
* 2
( )( )
1 ( )
l l
l l
l
f
g f
κ κ
κ κ
κ
+
= =
+
. Although * 0lκ = , the limit of the right 
hand side expression as * 0lκ →  (and therefore as * 2( )lf κ → +∞ ) is equal to one, a contradiction 
since ( )lg κ  is continuous. Therefore, we conclude that at the fixed point *κ  we must have 
*( ) 0jf κ =  for all j ∈Z  which means that *κ  represents a solution. 
(ii) Uniqueness. 
Suppose { }jξ  and { }jϕ  are distinct solutions. Therefore they must satisfy: 
0exp( )aj j j jk k
k
S G Sξ β ξ
∈
= + ∑
Z
 
0exp( )aj j j jk k
k
S G Sϕ β ϕ
∈
= + ∑
Z
,                                                   (B.3) 
for all j ∈Z , and they also satisfy the following equality: 
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exp( ) exp( ) 1a aj j j jj jS Sξ ϕ∈ ∈= =∑ ∑Z Z .                                (B.4) 
Define k k kε ξ ϕ= −  so that we have exp( )[exp( 1)]aj j j jk k
k
S ϕ ε β ε
∈
− = ∑
Z
. Let exp( )aj j jS ϕΛ =  and 
notice that exp( 1)j jε ε− ≥  to obtain jk k j j
k
β ε ε
∈
≥ Λ∑
Z
. This system can be written in the form 
[ ( )] 0B diag ε− Λ ≥ . Now choose a vector c  such that 0c ε′ < , which is always possible provided 
not all the jε s are zero (a fact that we have to accept since we have assumed the existence of 
two different solutions). By applying the Farkas’ lemma we obtain that since the above 
system has a solution, the system [ ( )]B diag cε− Λ = , 0ε ≥  must have no solution. Therefore, 
there exists no nonnegative vector ε  to satisfy jk k j j j
k
cβ ε ε
∈
= Λ +∑
Z
. We set j wε =  for all j so we 
know that there exists no nonnegative w to satisfy j jc w= − Λ . We will obtain an obvious 
contradiction provided we can show that the inequality 0c ε′ <  is satisfied. But 
2 0j j jj j
c c wε ε
∈ ∈
′ = = − Λ <∑ ∑
 
 since the jΛ s are positive. The contradiction shows that the 
solution must be unique. 
Farkas’ lemma: The system Ax c= , 0x ≥  has no solution if and only if the system 0A y′ ≥ , 
0c y′ <  has a solution. 
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Appendix C: Data from OECD Bank Profitability Report 
 
Figure C1: Staff costs (in % of total cost) by country over time 
 
 
Source: OECD Bank Profitability Report (2010).  
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